

Mind and Logic

October 9, 2009

Building 1467, room 415

Seminar program

9:00-9:15	Introduction by Nikolaj Zeuthen
9:15-10:30	Søren Harnow Klausen: Approaching the Abstract
10:30-10:45	Coffee break
10:45-12:00	Wojciech Żelaniec: The Synthetic Apriori
12:00-13:00	Lunch
13:00-14:15	Ingvar Johansson: The Ideal as Real and as Fictional
14:15-14:30	Coffee break
14:30-15:45	Frederik Stjernfelt: Antipsychologism in Peirce and Husserl
15:45-16:00	Recapitulation

Abstracts

Søren Harnow Klausen
Approaching the Abstract

Abstract (sic): A survey and critical discussion of some of the most prominent attempts to explain how we can have cognitive access to abstract objects. I argue that transcendental and indispensability arguments are insufficient and must be supplemented by a more constructive, psychological account and perhaps also a moderate ontological reduction.

Wojciech Żelaniec
The Synthetic Apriori

There are propositions so elementary and so self-evident—'no surface can be at the same time all green and red', for instance—that, for lack of a better name, they go under the Kantian or pseudo-Kantian name of 'synthetic a priori propositions', although what

Kant called so is only a small sub-group of those. Logical empiricists and their philosophical heirs have tried to show that such propositions are merely 'analytic'. Terminological quibbles ('but what really is "synthetic a priori"? And what is "analytic"?') aside, they do seem to present a philosophical problem (spotted for the first (?) time by Plato in *Phaedo*, pp. 103ff.), and I shall try to explain which part of that problem I find most interesting and challenging, as well as why I think it will not be resolved ultimately any soon.

Ingvar Johansson

The Ideal as Real and as Fictional

Abstract: I will argue that the problem of how we can identify and re-identify ideal objects can be solved given that two ontological assumptions are accepted. One is that of immanent realism, the view that there are entities of such a character that One of them (a universal) can wholly be In Many spatiotemporal places (its instances). The other is the un-reducibility of phenomenological intentionality and its three main genera: presentational intentionality, representational, and fictional. These assumptions imply that there are not only property and natural kind universals in the world, there are intentionality-universals, too. All instances of an intentionality-universal are directed towards the same entity, be this an object or a state of affairs. And this is as true for fictional intentionality as for representational and presentational. For instance, two different reading acts directed at Sherlock Holmes will be directed towards the same person; and this in spite of the fact that there is no such spatiotemporal person at all. Similarly, all arithmetical acts directed at number three will be directed towards the same object, even though there is no such spatiotemporal object; I dismiss without argument the Platonic realm. There are important differences between the literary fiction Sherlock Holmes and the mathematical fiction number three, but from a general ontological point of view, I think they exist in the same way.

Frederik Stjernfelt

Antipsychologism in Peirce and Husserl

Frege is famous for his attack on psychologism in logic and philosophy - but antipsychologism forms, in fact, a trinity. The foundations of semiotics and phenomenology in Peirce and Husserl are both highly dependent on their criticism of psychology as a road to signs, meaning, and experience. This paper compares the positions of the two in these matters.