SEMIOTICS

SEMINARS & LECTURES



FALL SEMESTER 1999

Center for Semiotics
UNIVERSITY OF AARHUS



René Magritte: *Les Pas perdus,* 1953.

INTRODUCTION

by Per Aage Brandt

Semiotics today, like any other scientific concern that has become a richly unfolded "field," is a polyphonic affair. No one doctrine can be christened dominant, and any introduction has to admit its status as a voice in the choir. This polyphony is mainly methodological and expresses the fact that the ontology of the field rests on grounds still more evident to all approaches: there is a realm of reality in which all social, psychic, cultural, cognitive, and linguistic phenomena must be rooted, namely the human Mind. In this realm, all understandings, interpretations, experiences, perceptions, and evaluations take on an extra quality, as not only being relevant in the view of what they are about, but also as states and events in their own right. They are then Meanings. Meanings are *mental realia* and are to be analyzed as such, both as to their immaterial, internal structure and as regards their material, external conditions and effects.

The apparent paradox of human minds exploring the human Mind as an explorable and therefore *limited* and *finite* entity, minds whose research should then be caught in a tautological trap or a vicious circle — an argument against the project still often heard from smart intellectual mystics — may be overcome by the simple observation that this object of investigation is *not* necessarily a finite entity and therefore is *not* bound to be trapped in tautology; it is an entity which does not have to be modeled in terms of objects from other realms. By contrast, *this* entity is both infinite and structured, although it thereby shows a clear affinity to the objects of mathematics. It is a well-known fact that language and culture can succesfully explore language and culture, and thought can explore thought; more generally, this is due to the same pseudo-paradoxical principle by which the infinite mind explores the structured mind.

The humanities, philosophy, sociology, psychology, and so forth *can* of course do what they are actually doing.

COVER ILLUSTRATION: René Magritte: *Tentative de l'impossible*. 1928.

The task of semiotics is therefore not to replace og reduce them, but simply to better understand the basic thing of which they are all thus producing knowledge, and to invent strategies for gaining more knowledge of it from the vantage point of a global or transversal view and a corresponding set of possible concepts. Local views and concepts pay for their refinement with their disciplined restrictions of scope, but may additionally be tried out in larger scales and scopes; reformulations stemming from different localities may shed light upon apparently trivial phenomena; and simple *reobservation* still seems to be an immensely rewarding basic resource, as acknowledged by formal phenomenology.

Let us briefly reobserve the phenomenon called Metaphor from the point of view of the mapping and blending — or conceptual integration — theory of mental spaces (originally conceived by analytic philosophy for the analysis of strange references in truth conditional semantics). In Danish, a rather common evaluative metaphor reads:

Han er en ørn til matematik
(*he is an eagle at mathematics = he is very good at it)

Instead of apperceiving only two distinct spaces here, the person's and the eagle's, let us add a third space for mathematical practice. The eagle *maps* onto the person, and the "being an eagle" forms a conceptual *blend* in which apparently the person has the eagle's supposedly sharp vision and gifts for supervising situations; and this creative result is *mapped* onto the mathematician's personage in the third space, which is in turn integrated with the eagle-man in a second blend, where the seeing is purely mental and directed at immaterial, invisible objects. **UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING** is the standard phrasing of the ratio of this integration.

But what happens is the following:



The choice of the properties of the eagle used in Blend 1 depends on the mapping of them onto Input 3, so there is no metaphor [Input 1 & Input 2] before this second mapping occurs. The *choice* of /vision/ instead of, say, flying or predating, is determined by the salience of /intelligence/ in Input 3. The Metaphor Concept **UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING** is a statement of this second mapping. Note that "understanding" is only "seeing" if the "understanding" in question is a salient topic in Input 3. Danes seldom say:

?He is an eagle at doing the dishes

and if they do, they would mean that he works fast and efficiently. **Som en ørn** (As an eagle) is an expression of this type.

Semiotically, we would need to add a Base Space to the architecture above, in order to account for the spatial setting in which the expression occurs, and to where the automatic interpretation /bright, clever/ is sent from Blend 2. Then, the entire network would account for a sign relation existing between the *signifier* in the Base Space that triggers the network and the signified contained in the ultimate blend of the cascade, which becomes mentally present to the hearer of the expression, still in Base Space.

Metaphors are networks of this sort, with three Inputs as a minimum and two Blend Spaces, each with a dual input, as a minimum, organized in a cascade. They are immediately processed and automated structures in language and thought, as well as in iconic or gestural expressive practices (painting, acting).

In the art of acting called playing (performing dramas or simply doing infantile playing), the mimetic role is Input 1, the acting agent is Input 2, and the specific situation with its specific frame is Input 3. So:

Now I am Hamlet

is a metaphor and a perfectly meaningful piece of dramaturgic information.

Speaking is of course a form of acting; when a dialog is referred to, even by indirect discourse, the same network is active. It is one of the cognitive routines by which humans can use signs in a semantically creative way, e.g. by saying one thing and meaning another — if the contrast between Input 1 and Input 3 gets drastic (cf., in the example, the domain of animal behavior and that of human academic behavior).

Note also that the *dynamics* inherent in Input 3 is important in its metaphoric appropriateness. The doing to which it refers is considered to be *difficult*, so the agent meets resistance and has to brave it by some special additional forces; the outcome is never assured, and every success is a victory (another metaphor, substituting a warrier for the eagle). Furthermore, there is a dynamic of hunting in our example's Input 1 (eagle searching, mouse hiding), which is essential for the second mapping. Mappings are thus not only figurative, but most often at least driven by the compatibility or affinity of two dynamic settings.

E. A. Poe's, and in a sense Raymond Queneau's, idea that **poets are the mathematicians of language** (X is the Y of Z) has the metaphorical mathematician in Input 1, the language situation in Input 3, and a hidden pronominal person in Input 2 (viz. if /you/ want to be a poet, then be a mathematician of language). So, by the first blend, this person becomes a mathematician *tout court*; in the second mapping, we attend the fecundation of Input 3 by this first blend: use your head, find the abstract regularities, solve its equations... and language will no longer resist you. The projection of these two dynamic and figurative scenes into the final blend yields *the poet* — we are told how to produce such a creature. Bad poetry follows from not projecting sufficient material from Blend 1 into Blend 2. So, the XYZ structure has Y=Input 1, Z=Input 3, X=Blend 2, not Input 2. X is the unknown (what is a poet?), determined at last by the blended dynamics.

The network considered is only one of many mental routines that seem to serve our online processing of perceptions, communications, and imaginations. But this one is particularly common. Whenever we experience something unusual, we will encapsulate it in an Input 3 and mobilize kinds of knowledge in Input 1, and so on. We will ourselves be in the position of X, until the final blend shows us a plausible attitude to assume.

Input 1 may contain a full verbal phrasing of some scenario. If the unphrased experience we are attending is in Input 3, we will first blend ourselves (Input 2) with Input 1 by imagining that we use this phrasing, and then blend this blend with Input 3, *if* the second mappings work out. The result is our phrasing of the experience using the text from Input 1. We will then have used a "construction" in a new sense. More often, some of Input 3's event parts are phrased in Input 3, in which case the final result will be a blended construction.

Our access to language — i.e. to linguistic items, from words to prosodic wholes — is apparently never isolated from having an idea of some scenario. This is probably due to the implicit presence of an observer in any scenario: it has a perspective; this observer is also a virtual speaker, and we only think of language as being used by someone in some context, unless we are linguists (perceiving language without using it).

Issues like these will be raised in the following series of seminars, open to all students and colleagues. Ph.D. students and those writing their M.A. thesis, as well as undergraduates inscribed for the two-semester Supplementary Course *(Suppleringsfag)* will receive supervision on request.

PAaB

SEMINAR ON **GENERAL SEMIOTICS**

Per Aage Brandt.

Wednesdays in seminar weeks, 2:00 pm - 5:00 pm. Auditorium 221.

1 **Models of Narrative Structure**
2 **Basic Dynamics of Everyday Experience**
3 **Causal Structures and Their Figurative Dynamics**
4 **Intentional Networks, Dialogue, and Humor**
5 **Poetry and a Cognitive Poetics**
6 **Musical Imagination**
7 **Human Time and Its Spaces**
8 **Metaphors and Domains Again**

In this seminar, we will analyze examples and discuss generalizations. We will also outline the general framework of the *dynamic cognitive semiotics* approach to the study of meaning. This approach starts from the assumption that humans are not only originally, but *constantly* dependent on their interaction with a prestructured, experienceable reality that informs the neuro-phenomenological systems embraced by the term Cognition, and that humans therefore do not have to *invent* the (e.g. causal) schemas by which they frame perceived events. As embodied subjects, they pick them up from the surrounding mesoscopic world and transpose them from one experiential *domain* to another. There is a finite basic set of experiential domains which are also semantic domains when they are referred to by expressive events occurring in non-basic domains, such as the domain of symbolic communication. The content of a basic experiential domain is *formed* by the double nature of factual *percepts* and the neural integration going on in our *perception*. The resulting *forms* become *schemas* when they are projected into different domains. These schemas always intrinsically combine shapes and forces (figurative and dynamic properties). Instead of floating freely around in our mind, schemas naturally encapsulate in small units of meaning, the so-called mental spaces; these spaces appear in networks, linked together by mapping and projection into selective and creative 'blends.' The structure of these networks and their relation to the expressive events that trigger or 'prompt for' them are now major concerns of semantic analysis.

Let us consider an example. Looking at the scar after an operation, a hospital patient exclaims: **This surgeon is a butcher!** — This is an expressive event, a verbal metaphor. Using the *five-space model* explained in the introduction, we have an image space as Input 1: /butcher/, a situation space as Input 3: /surgeon/, and a referential or

deictic space as Input 2. In the first blend, properties including /brutality/, /cynism/, /violence/, /inconsiderateness/, are extracted from Input 1 and projected onto a clone of the person referred to (this...), from Input 2. This blend maps by *contrast* to Input 3 (a surgeon must be considerate, empathic, non-violent), and from Blend1 and Input 3 projections of the unpleasant personage and of the standard surgeon form the final Blend2: /bad surgeon/. Viz.:



Extractions for the first blend are motivated by the contrast mappings that prepare the second blend. Therefore, only *bad* surgeons are butchers. But many other people supposed to behave considerately can therefore metaphorically be butchers when they don't.

René Magritte: *L'Art de la conversation IV.*

SEMINAR ON **COGNITION AND SEMIOTICS**

Svend Østergaard.

Wednesdays of the seminar weeks, 12:00 pm -2:00 pm. Auditorium 219.

The seminar is an introduction to the theory of *mental spaces*, the *embodiment hypothesis*, and a *dynamic theory of meaning processing*. With this in view, selected parts of *The Literary Mind*, by Mark Turner, and *Philosophy in the Flesh*, by George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, will be presented. Mental spaces and blendings seem to account for some structural properties of human expressions. This will be demonstrated through readings of short stories as well as analyses of paintings such as Magritte's. The purpose of the seminar, though, is not only to present a technical tool for analyzing meaning, it is also to discuss the "ontology" of meaning. In American cognitive linguistics, meaning is solely based on the biology of the individual, *The Flesh*. Any human expression is therefore the result of an elaborate system of mappings, determined by the neuro-biological makeup of the individual and rooted in basic human experience. For instance, the American tradition considers topological structures, such as a topological form in a painting by Magritte, as a mind-internal construction projected into the external world. However, one could also consider topological forms as the manifestation of certain *constraints* on human imagination. These constraints could then be viewed as transcendental schemas, as in the Kantian tradition, or as inherent ontological conditions that exist independently of the human brain. To discuss these problems we will examine Lakoff & Johnson's readings of the philosophical tradition as they are presented in *Philosophy in the Flesh*. We will end up with a conception of meaning that combines the mind-dependent constructive aspect with the existence of mind-independent geometric and dynamic constraints.

René Magritte: *Les Merveille de la nature,* 1953.

SEMINAR ON **SEMIO-LINGUISTICS**

Lene Fogsgaard and Per Aage Brandt.

Thursdays, September 2 & 30, October 28, November 25, 12:00 pm -2:00 pm. Auditorium 221.

This semester is dedicated to the study of syntactic *constructions* in language, constructional blending, stemmatic structures, and their semantics. A construction is, according to R. Langacker, A. Goldberg, et al, a pairing of Form and Meaning. Form means expression and Meaning means content. Words, phrases, clauses, sentences, and paragraphs are constructions. This variation in scale implies a need for understanding the integration of items of different scale: of words into phrases, phrases into clauses, clauses into sentences, sentences into paragraphs. For each step, integration must occur both in Form and in Meaning; there must therefore exist a generic structure on both levels, thus a Form design and a Meaning design, and a third structure assuring the maintained pairing. We believe that the generic structure of Form is a canonical complementation device — the *stemmatic* semio-syntactic routine is a better candidate than a concatenation of linear strings — just as the generic structure of Meaning, paired with it, can be rendered as a network of schematized mental spaces.

Example. Expletives and other 'strange' but common expressions may be good occasions for elaborating on these assumptions and understanding the alleged structures:

(1) **What in thunder made him do that? vs. What made him do that?**

(2) **It makes a hell of a difference! vs. It makes a difference.**

/Make/ seems to be an attractor of such dramatic expansions. In (1), the speaker cannot find a good reason for the bad act; he then continues his search /in thunder/. In (2), he comments on a small but decisive detail and illustrates its decisiveness by the fatal destination /hell/ according to God's verdict; hell is indeed different from heaven. Both meanings are metaphorical (see above). But what happens to the syntactic forms? Do they crash? Not at all. In (1), the preposition localizes /what/ in this non-recommendable place. In (2), a genitive of identification interprets /a difference/ as a non-negligible entity. The two emphatic "non-s" are simply obtained by unusual syntax (and a clear semantic operation), but not by a pure chaotic irruption in the linear manifestation. The construction is still regularly structured.

SEMINAR ON **PSYCHO-SEMIOTICS**

Svend Østergaard and Per Aage Brandt.

Thursdays, 15-17. Auditorium 221.

The theme of the seminar this semester is *Mind and Brain*. We aim to learn from neuroscientists and 'neuro-philosophers' about the brain's processing of the kind of information that consciousness is made of or rather receives when it experiences something present or represented. Is there a general design in human brains that maps onto Kant's transcendental subjectivity or some other leveled model of the mind (e.g. G. M. Edelman's)? We will also compare semiotic findings to neurological findings in order to see what phenomena seem to be grouped together. If the semiotic system of semantic *domains* has a stable base, it will be relevant to look for its neural correlates. If *temporal* patterns in experience have stable semantic unfoldings corresponding to their extensions (cf. E. Pöppel's 3-second-long window, in this program), this indicates the existence of some strong constraints on the corresponding neural integrations. And we will imagine or prepare new experiments designed to explore the functions of *emotions*, *modality*, *conceptual blending*, *narrativity*, *categorization*, and the impact of mental states (mood, passion) and *psychopathology* on these functions.

The question of whether there are different 'styles' of cognition, an aesthetic style versus a practical-agentive style, and so on, will be addressed. To illustrate, here is a simple new idea concerning this issue: Distinct levels of 'abstraction' — such as those of 1) *notional and symbolic thinking (maximally 'abstract')*; 2) *situational and strategic thinking (medially 'abstract')*; and 3) *direct reactive, interactive, and perceptive thinking (minimally 'abstract')* — might appear by hierarchical inhibition: (1) requiring that (2) and (3) be inhibited; (2) requiring that (1) be inhibited. If this is the case, *aesthetic* experiences and performances by contrast resemble *communicative* mental attitudes in having both (3) and (1) but not (2) active. In aesthetic cognition, (2) remains inhibited, whereas in communication the activity of (2) is only delayed. In aesthetic communication, e.g. in coordinated musical performing, there is a constant tilting [(1) & (3)]//(2) going on. But it seems impossible to have all registers open and active simultaneously. This crisis of the state of (3) during expressive experiences and behaviors might give us the key to the neural specificity of *expressive mental behavior*: this cognitive style intermittently reopens (3) when it 'should be' closed under (1), but it does so by only profiling special sensory submodes — tonal and phonetic hearing, chromatic and graphic seeing, rhythmic motor sensitivity — attentive to (bodily reproducible, preferentially) sensory events that hereby become signifiers and supports for the simultaneously ongoing (1)-events, namely notional meanings, their signifieds. If this anti-inhibitive openness of (3) under (1) is strongly reinforced, by training or by the insistent formal properties of the perceived object, the simultaneous (1)-events lose their sharpness and fade into the mental shadows we call intuitions, sentiments, associations, vague and open-ended ideas: aesthetic meanings.

SEMINAR ON **PHILOSOPHICAL SEMIOTICS**

Peer F. Bundgaard.

Wednesdays, September 15, October 13, November 10, December 8, 10:00 am - 12:00 pm, Aud. 219.

Semester theme:
Manifestation and Meaning in Art

In this seminar, we will continue our investigation into the phenomenology and the semiotics of art. Our question is rather naive (and thus difficult to answer): What kind of an object is a work of art? It is worthwhile asking this question since works of art are things like any other objects in the world: they are singular entities endowed with a manifest mode of being; they are objects of perception and comprehension, and so on. Yet the meaning they express is seemingly not exhausted by their mere manifestation (in the way the 'meaning' of the book I am looking for, when I am looking for it, is exhausted by my finding it).

One of the main difficulties in any investigation of art is probably to find and give an adequate description of how 'art meaning' is founded on 'thing meaning' within the same object; i.e., how is our consciousness intentionally related to objects that are both things and beautiful?

Special attention will be payed to Roman Ingarden's analyses of these problems in his *Zur [or: Die] Ontologie des litterarischen Kunstwerks (available in English: http://amazon.com* or *Statsbiblioteket).*



René Magritte: *Les Idées claires,* 1958.

INTRODUCTION TO **SEMIOTICS**

Peter Hammer.

Wednesdays in seminar weeks, 10:00 am - 12:00 pm, Aud. 221.

This seminar will introduce some of the theories and models used at The Center for Semiotic Research. The presentation will follow the first four main components of the future curriculum of semiotic studies.

1. *Philosophy and general semiotics*. Under this heading, theories about the relation between object, concept, and language will be presented. It will mainly revolve around René Thom's philosophy of nature and European phenomenology, which together have made a realistic theory of meaning possible.

2. *The semiotics of arts*. This includes the theories of *mental spaces* and *blendings*. In a complex expression, such as a narrative or a painting, the global meaning is made up of local meanings which constitute independent mental representational wholes, i.e. mental spaces. The theory accounts for what type of connections we encounter between the local spaces and how these connections make it possible to conceive of the global expression as a coherent unit. A blending is a special kind of connection by projection, in which the local spaces are intertwined.

3. *Cognition.* This covers the theory of conceptual metaphors and an introduction to the various concepts of the cognitive schema (Rumelhart, Lakoff, Turner, and Talmy). At the Center for Semiotic Research, the following approach is taken. There are topological and dynamic aspects of the phenomenal world which play a decisive role in the constitution of abstract schemas and thereby in the generation of concepts, cf. 1. However, the operation of blending concepts generates "new" meaning which is not bound to the external world, i.e. the blended meaning represents a variation of the bodily entrenched spatial, temporal, and dynamic schemata.

4. *Semio-linguistics*. The insights presented in the third component will be applied to linguistic material. In addition, a theory on semantic domains will be presented in some detail. This theory is used to understand the relation of language to the world of meaning. In the semio-linguistic part some of the semiotic classics — Greimas and Hjelmslev — will also be briefly presented, and the stemmatic syntax theory of construction will be demonstrated.

GUEST PROFESSOR: **TODD OAKLEY**

Professor Oakley wil be visiting the Center in November, 1999. More detailed information will available soon.

The Center has invited the American cognitive and literary scholar, professor **Todd Oakley** from Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, as its guest professor this semester. He will be at the Center for two weeks in November (further details will follow) and lecture on the general topic of **attention**, according to the following plan:

Toward a Grammar of Attention

I will attempt to articulate a cognitive linguistic theory of rhetoric. These sessions are based on chapters from a book project I am currently outlining.

Session 1: *Mental Space Theory and Rhetorical Design*
Session 2: *Principles of A Grammar of Attention*
Session 3: *Descriptive Applications (Linguistic and Rhetorical Ananlyses)*
Session 4: *A Grammar of Attention and Cultural Materialism*

Todd Oakley is the co-founder of the Cognition and Literature Group. His research interests include poetics, rhetoric, narrative structure, argumentation, description, styles of writing, implicit models in the organization of information in general, cognitive science, and evolutionary theories of meaning.

His recent journal articles and book chapters illustrate the scope of his work:

"The New Rhetoric and the Construction of Value: Presence, the Universal Audience, and Beckett's 'Three Dialogues'", 1997; "Conceptual Blending, Narrative Discourse, and Rhetoric", 1998; "The Human Rhetorical Potential", 1999. "Blending and Metaphor", (in press); "Purple Persuasion: Conceptual Blending and Deliberative Rhetoric" (with Seana Coulson, in press); "Copious Reasoning: The Student Writer as an Astute Observer of Language" (in press).

http://www.cwru.edu/artsci/engl/faculty/oakley.html

GUEST PROFESSOR: **ERNST PÖPPEL**

Professor Pöppel wil be visiting the Center in November, 1999. More detailed information will available soon,

The Center for Semiotic Research and CfK have invited the German neuroscientist professor **Ernst Pöppel,** Dr. Phil. et Med., from the Institute of Medical Psychology at Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, as their guest professor. Professor Pöppel will be at the Centre November 18th and 19th and will be giving lectures both days from 1:00 pm to 3:00 pm in room 221, Finlandsgade 28, on his special subject of study, *Time and Consciousness: A hierarchical model of temporal perception*.

Ernst Pöppel has thoroughly examined the brain's integration of perceptive and cognitive components in the experience of here-and-now events, of moments of presence, and found that there is a radical difference between the experience of sensory details, single sound profiles, gleams of light, and so on, organized in high frequency atemporal states in periods of about 30 milliseconds; and on the other hand, the experienced moment of presence (perceiving, remembering, evaluating, volition) that prepares action, or of sensorimotoric coordination, or, remarkably enough, of linguistic practice in the shape of expressed or perceived sentence patterns and similar expressive sequences, such as for instance musical ones, which are automatically organized in low frequency atemporal states, so-called *windows*, in periods of about 3 seconds. Thus, we live in a temporality shaped like a sequence of 3-second-long windows, rather than in an infinitely divisible continuous flow.

Pöppel is both schooled in the humanities and he is a prominent neurologist. His work is an exciting example of research that links the qualitative and the quantitative in the functioning of consciousness, phenomenology and neurology, with a view to better understanding the bodily constituted human universe of signification.

His publications include the following:

"Oscillations as a possible basis for time perception", 1972; "Time perception", 1978; *Grenzen des Bewusstseins*, 1985; *Mindworks: Time and Conscious experience*, 1988; "The measurement of music and the cerebral clock: A new theory", 1989; Pöppel et al.: "Temporal and spatial constraints for mental modelling", 1991; "Temporal mechanisms of consciousness", 1993; "Temporal mechanisms in perception", 1994; "Consciousness versus states of being conscious", 1997.

The Institute of Medical Psychology, which he directs, describes its objective thus:

"The Institute of Medical Psychology was founded in 1977. As medical psychology has come to play an important part in preclinical education of medical students, it was decided to establish an autonomous scientific institution with emphasis on teaching and research activities in this field.

The research at our institute can be defined as the attempt to understand psychological phenomena through brain function, and thus to try to build a bridge between neurosciences and psychology."

GUEST PROFESSOR: **SHAUN GALLAGHER**

Professor Gallagher wil be visiting the Center in September, 1999. More detailed information will available soon.

The American philosopher, professor **Shaun Gallagher**, Director of the Cognitive Science Program at Canisius College, Buffalo, will visit the Center on September 16 and lecture 13-15 (Aud. 221) on the following topic: *Motor and Communicative Theories of Gesture.*

Shaun Gallagher is working at the intersection of the phenomenological tradition and cognitive science; this is reflected in his recent book *The Inordinance of Time* (1998), which also welcomes social sciences, art and literature as relevant approaches. He is especially interested in the relation between subpersonal processes and personal-intentional experience, problems connected with personal identity and self-consciousness in ways that lead to ethical issues. He finds that philosophical hermeneutics and critical theory is compatible with certain aspects of cognitive science. His interdisciplinary interests include neuropsychology, neurophysiology, and developmental psychology; recently he has dedicated attention to psychopathology (self-reference in schizophrenia; spatial perception in autism). He is the co-editor of the "Models of the Self" issues of *Journal of Consciousness Studies* (1997-1999).

http://www.canisius.edu/~gallaghr/pi.html



René Magritte: *Le Monde invisible, 1954*

S E M I N A R C A L E N D A R

September			
Wednesday 1	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics	
Thursday 2	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-linguistics	15-17: Psycho-semiotics
Wednesday 15	10-12: Philosophical Semiotics	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 16	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	13:-18: Semiotic Research Group Meeting	
Wednesday 29	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics	
Thursday 30	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-linguistics	15-17: Psycho-semiotics
October			
Wednesday 13	10-12: Philosophical Semiotics	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 14	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	13:-18: Semiotic Research Group Meeting	
Wednesday 27	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics	
Thursday 28	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-linguistics	15-17: Psycho-semiotics
November			
Wednesday 10	10-12: Philosophical Semiotics	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 11	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	13:-18: Semiotic Research Group Meeting	
Wednesday 24	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics	
Thursday 25	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-linguistics	15-17: Psycho-semiotics
December			
Wednesday 8	10-12: Philosophical Semiotics	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 9	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	13:-18: Semiotic Research Group Meeting	

Center for Semiotics

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