


SEMIOTICS

SEMINARS · LECTURES



FALL SEMESTER 2000

Center for Semiotics
UNIVERSITY OF AARHUS



Pablo Picasso: *Female Torso*, 1953. Aquatinte.

Cover illustration:

Pablo Picasso: *Woman and Gentleman*, 1968.

Center for Semiotics

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INTRODUCTION

What is there to understand? – Some introductory answers

by Per Aage Brandt

There are fundamentally two ways to conceive of and to study the human world – the world of cultures and social constructions, destructions, and reconstructions, or of human communication and violence – and two grounding, but inverse, questions to ask: either (1) we want to know why people cannot basically understand each other very well, or (2) we want to know what it is that makes people communicate anyway. The first question was implicitly or explicitly asked by the classical humanists and has motivated historiography, philology, aesthetics, and some versions of psychology and philosophy – those that ended in the blind alleys of psychoanalysis and deconstructive pragmatism. The second question was asked by rationalists and scientists, for whom ‘understanding’ was rather a matter of grasping ‘things understood’ than of persons following each others’ thought.

Ad (1): History is differential by nature; specific things have happened to nations, groups, and individuals, things that have shaped specific experiences that in turn have determined specific decisions and subsequent behaviors; to share some of these specificities is then to ‘belong’ to a community and to inherit its ‘identity’ and ‘values’. People that did not share those historical events, experiences, interpretations, and reactions cannot understand each other, it is supposed. Within, versus across, such communities, communication should in principle be maximally coherent and harmonious: a community ‘communi-cates’ with itself as one single

mind would do, if it had to – but it does not, and neither does the community, besides the necessity of a pedagogical initiation and updating of newborns and newcomers. Pedagogy would be the prototype of maximal communication; paradoxically, but essentially, this prototype is rather a case of minimal communication, since it must mainly work in one direction, from initiator to initiatee. Communities, alias cultures, are therefore essentially silent, we might think, as silent as the spirits that animate them... By contrast, intercultural contact, which cannot be pedagogical without being imperialistic, is noisy, and inauthentic, since it can only grow from misunderstandings, through polemics, to violence. The first question is somehow being answered: there is no understanding in communication, because intersubjective relations are either too close (inside a community) or too distant (between community and outsider, or between communities) to support an understanding-based communication. But according to this humanistic view, this negative result is by no means tragic, for the simple reason that communication is not really important – not nearly as important as are spirits, identities, and values, those silent motors of communitary life in the historical world. This is still the view of historicism, hermeneutics, and other forms of nominalism.

The inverse question (2) springs from observation. Given that humans live in communities of work, worship, and kinship, misunderstandings are highly fre-

quent within these frameworks, disputes are default, and conflicts are so normal that they give rise to regulations, laws, hierarchies of authority and power, juridical systems, and abundant literature. The emotional life of individuals is directly attuned to such an agonistic scenario. Offense and humiliation are among the primordial motives for human action, including revenge, search for justice, struggles for freedom (despite the communitary constraints), acts of despair, self-destruction, crime, religion, and, possibly, art. Here, one important aspect of communication unfolds, namely the ascription of evil intents to others, the human faculty of biased mutual interpretation in terms of intentional wrongdoing. Within a larger community, there are infinitely many occasions to practise and develop this faculty, which is evidently responsible for the majority of cultural events that count as contents of a cultural whole, a 'tradition', a 'discourse', a communitary universe. So, religions offer convenient notional support for the ascription of evil to individual or collective beings and doings. Doctrines standardly contain portraits of heretics and so forth, thereby helping us hate each other systematically, so to speak, instead of chaotically. Evil as such, detected by persons as being present in persons that decline its presence, is a useful example of a non-value which is nevertheless a significant and meaningful content of social communication: a piece of semiotic reality. Communities are in fact highly communicative, perhaps less due to shared experiences than to contrasting interpretations of semiotic realities like the one just mentioned. Such contrasts are semiotically active as *variations* on identifiable themes. But these variations are precisely non-historical, in the sense that they manifest and often explicitly claim to be manifes-

tations of a *natural logic* that knowingly fills the gaps between insufficient evidences and urgently needed conclusions by supplementary premisses drawn from causal intuitions, narrative standard patterns, and other available semiotic *realia* whose relevance is then vividly disputed. Instead of being cases of misunderstanding, such debates simply show comparable stances, differences ascribed to viewpoints based on equal commitment to aspects of human reality as such, not essentially as history, but rather as an *ontology of life*. Nobody can successfully justify an act by presenting the history of its agent. This is the meaning of the natural notion of free will.

Intercultural communication is as meaningful as intracultural debates. It is only agonistic in politics, but generally it is less conflictual and correspondingly more epistemic, since authorities do not regulate it, and issues of freedom are less at stake. A cross-cultural view of states of affairs is perhaps, by contrast to the above, above all an occasion to see how *different themes* are played with the *same variations* from culture to culture. Therefore, people can cross-culturally tell each other's stories, import and export narratives, discuss causes of and reasons for others' actions and passions, as well as translate texts from language to language and contribute to each other's knowledge of 'the world'. That there is a 'world' is a natural intuition which communities truly have in common. The philosopher's (intercultural) task is to try to find the meanings of such an *ontology of things*.

Semiotics, as a study of the two ontologies (of life, of things) is incompatible with the assumptions presented here as answers to the first question (1). It assumes that the understanding of people and the understanding of

reality are inseparable; ontology cannot be dropped in favor of some *Horizontversmeltzung* or fusion of horizons, as Rorty and Gadamer say, between spiritual entities. Meanings as intelligible variations on intelligible themes are deeper than history and can therefore shape it.

In semiotics, humans are supposed to have a mental life rather than a spiritual one: consciousness is supposed to be a mental phenomenon dependent on brains that cooperate in many ways – agonistically or epistemically – in elaborating meanings through communication; and communication is thus both necessary for human minds and *possible* on the grounds of the principle that minds *mind* each other as composers and

players of themes and variations, using the notes of reality and the intelligibility of freedom that our ancestors called rationality, but which could also be called imagination, to organize them into phrases and songs that attune us to the music of chance and regularity played ‘out there’: this attunement is called truth, and there are no communications without minds searching for it. Successfully? To remain in the metaphor, as successfully as my steps can follow the drum-and-bass rhythm resounding, through the wall, from my extatic neighbour’s apartment... This is the correspondance principle in action: there is no abyss to cross, just a vibrating wall.



Pablo Picasso: *Woman bathing*, 1944. Pencil.

SEMINAR ON GENERAL SEMIOTICS

Subjectivity and Objectivity in Texts

Per Aage Brandt

Wednesdays in seminar weeks, 2:15 - 5:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

This semester, some (even most) of the ideas worked on during the latest years will be mobilized for a new description of *textual* meaning. Written language differs from spoken in so many respects that people who fail to distinguish the two forms ‘talk like a book’ or seem to ‘read aloud’ when speaking: literature is prototypically *written* – by tiny hand movements and over possibly discontinuous stretches of time, with access to retouching any part – and this absence of real-time communication, gestural contact, on-line dialog (no repetitions needed, no interruptions of discourse possible), creates a distinct semiotic framework for the display of *subjectivity* in the sense of an open space for shaping an imaginary intentional source-subject, or a ‘mind construction’, based on significant affective voicing, significant viewpoint variation, narrative display, descriptive listing, degrees of lexical refinement, and of unfolded reasoning – the occasional absence of which is therefore a highly efficient manifestation of authority, contempt, symbolic brutality, or pathos (simulated simplemindedness). This might be called the external aspect of textual significance.

The architecture of internal textual meaning, whether literary or pragmatic, can be coherently studied as a structured and layered whole, in which stable forms of language, and in particular linguistic morphology, are important constructive resources: temporal markers build stratified semantic networks, pronominal and adverbial expressions specify enunciation, quantifiers provide logical depth, and syntactic markers indicate the

sort of expository rhythm that makes any textual flow border on silence. None of this would have been possible without an underlying structural and cognitively grounded design activated by these (and many other) textual specifiers. Semiotic research aims at detecting and modelling this structural purport of actualised meaning, its *objectivity* – through which it is read and primarily understood.

The dimensions of *external subjectivity* and *internal objectivity* in texts, in the sense indicated here, seem to be interrelated in much the same way as presentation and representation, e.g. in paintings, namely, as a *dynamic conflict* that determines the attention of the interpreter who will then, in the course of secondary readings, project structure back and forth between the objective ‘content’ structures of their language (cf. representation) and the subjective modes and attitudes of their ‘writteness’ (cf. presentation), until either one of them ‘wins’ by integrating the other, as in institutional texts, or an inconclusive end state is reached, as in the texts we call great literature. Inconclusiveness seems to be aesthetically crucial; it singularizes *the* text and makes it feel ‘alive’ – still on its way towards meaning. Such a text can be ‘followed’ by a sensitive interpretive critique, but cannot be exhaustively interpreted. It accompanies us as we accompany it, and this intimacy makes us feel ‘alive’ ourselves (humans apparently have a problem with the instability of that fundamental but still unreliable feeling).

SEMINAR ON SEMIO-LINGUISTICS

Lene Fogsgaard and Per Aage Brandt

Thursdays (see calendar), 12:15 - 2:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

In this seminar, linguistic meaning and its morpho-lexico-syntactic (re)presentations are discussed and compared to other semiotic and cognitive articulations of meaning and expressive forms. This semester the seminar will focus on *language acquisition*.

Are small children linguistically creative or conservative? Do they learn nouns before verbs (and if so, why)? What is the relation between speech production and comprehension? How and when do infants acquire argument structure? How do infants avoid grammatical overgeneralization? Is form or meaning the most important dimension in acquisition? These and many other acquisitional (ontogenetic) questions are asked in the fascinating field of language acquisition. Most of these questions have not received a definitive answer yet. At a multi-disciplinary crossroads between cognitive science, developmental psychology, and linguistics (psycholinguistics, studies in language handicaps, and so forth) we will take up some of the major general issues of current research and sometimes restate them in a semio-linguistic perspective.

As our first topic we will discuss the arguments of different theories of language acquisition in order to find out if they can assist our understanding of language as a whole. Infants' language acquisition has been considered either as

- a result of imitation and selective reinforcement,
- an innate language acquisition device (LAD) according to the so-called continuity assumption that

children are born equipped with a special language module. This modular device is assumed to contain an adult-like universal grammatical competence (eg. the existence of word order, word classes, and syntactic schemas) which is only waiting to be developed by performance,

- a cognitive specialization based on general capacities for conceptualization and categorization in the framework of bodily interaction with things and people. Linguistic structures will then emerge only if there is an already-established cognitive foundation.

In the following sessions we intend to address the issue of lexical vs. syntactical development and of the role of the pragmatic field through reflections on the role of input such as so-called 'motherese' (in different cultures) in order to finally take up the classical question of whether ontogenesis can give us clues as to the evolution of language in our species (phylogenesis) – or as to the nature and the architecture of this thing called Language and its range of possible varieties or differentiations.

INTRODUCTION TO SEMIOTICS

Peter Hammer

Thursdays in seminar weeks, 10:15 a.m. - 12:00 noon. Auditorium 221.

This seminar is an introduction to some of the theories and models used at the Center for Semiotics and is intended as a supplement to all the other activities going on at the Center. The introduction will include: cognitive theories - Conceptual Blending (Turner & Fauconnier), Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier & Sweetser), Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson) and

Semantic Domains (Per Aage Brandt); dynamic theories - Catastrophe Theory and Morphodynamics (Thom & Petitot), and classical semiotics - the theories of Hjelmslev, Peirce, and Greimas. We will also take up relevant issues from the other seminars that need to be discussed and reviewed again.

SEMINAR ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND LANGUAGE

Peer F. Bundgård

Thursdays (see calendar), 12:15 a.m. - 2:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

This seminar will serve as a short introductory course on cognitive linguistics. It will discuss some of the most important assumptions in cognitive linguistics (particularly in R. Langacker's and L. Talmy's work). It will pay very special attention to the idea that language structure does not constitute a self-contained, formal system, but is experientially based and essentially connected to our characteristic way of perceiving and processing sense-data. The idea that formal, linguistic structure is grounded on and describable in terms of original phenomenological, "pre-conceptual" structure can be traced back to Husserl (e.g. *Erfahrung und Urteil*), and has been submitted to very detailed, "proto-cognitive" analysis by R. Ingarden in his *Das literarische Kunstwerk*.

Though most of the time will be spent on simply unfolding the crucial assumptions of cognitive linguistics, both Husserl and Ingarden will be included in our

discussions as a means of putting the topic of the seminar in perspective.

Reading list

General suggestion: I recommend that students get hold of the Danish translations of some of R. Langacker's, L. Talmy's, Turner & Fauconnier's, and G. Lakoff's articles as well as the general introduction to these (you can ask at the secretariat for the first-draft version of the book in which they will be published, *Dynamisk semiotik*).

Otherwise, the following texts will be commented on:

- (1) R. Langacker, "Introduction" to *Concept, Image, and Symbol*.
- (2) R. Langacker, "Nouns and Verbs".
- (3) L. Talmy, "The Relation of Grammar to Cognition".
- (4) E. Sweetser, "Compositionality and Blending".

SEMINAR ON PSYCHO-SEMIOTICS

Svend Østergaard and Per Aage Brandt

Thursdays (see calendar), 3:15 - 5:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

In this semester, we will focus on the staging of the body and the meaning of body gestures. Although the term 'gesture' will be used in the largest sense, including locomotion and instrumental motion, we will mainly be occupied with symptomatic gestures expressing emotions and other affective states, and expressive gestures, through which meaning is 'shown' to others. Just as locomotion and instrumental motion are connected in many acts (e.g. to 'gather'; cf. the Danish periphrasis "han går og samler ting op"), so are symptomatic and expressive gestures, either by 'symptomati- zing' expressive gestures (tics) or by 'expressivizing' symptomatic gestures (e.g. in rhetoric).

Gestures in this narrower sense are often performed in parallel with loco-instrumental bodily doings, but it is particularly interesting to study how both pairs of gestures are affected, when the gesturing person discovers that he is *perceived* by another person. Similarly, from the viewpoint of the observer, the interpretation of the gestural cluster is changed, if the observer discovers that the gesturing person intends him to *recognize* the gesture. Via these questions we approach the theme of simulation and manipulation and thereby the important question of what *theatrical* behaviour is. One analytic distinction is evident here: in the case of acting, the predicate expressed by the gesture does not stick to the performer in 'base space', i.e. the space of the here-and-now of ongoing communication. For instance, if a man is walking lurchingly, one might say: "this man is drunk", and the manner of his walking is a predicate

active here and now, but if the man does it in order to show us how *a* drunkard would walk, this predicate is about someone outside base space, and the demonstrative behavior is theatrical. This phenomenon is equivalent to what we find in the so-called *enunciational* structure in language, so "(I think) this woman is beautiful" commits the speaker in base space to defending the expressed predicate, whereas "John says this woman is beautiful" does not. The meaning of gestures and especially theatricality in gestures can thus be analysed as construed by *delegation of viewpoint* (or delegated spaces), operating in parallel to the way in which language can delegate the viewpoint from the real speaker to other imagined speakers, and even to an olympic instance. In the seminar we will therefore present an unfolded general model of enunciational structure and a thorough examination of the types of space delegations we can encounter, with the aim of presenting a *mental-space network of enunciation*, relevant for the general understanding of theatrical gestures in human behavior and social practices.

The theory of mental spaces as developed by Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier will thus be an important part of the theoretical background for the analysis of specific gestures, such as "making a nose at someone" (as analyzed by R. Posner e.a.). Specific analyses might be worked out as exercises and presented by the students during the seminar.

Reading list:

Brandt, Per Aage, 2000, "From Gesture to Theatricality – On Enunciation and the Art of Being Visible", CISL-Urbino paper, unpublished.

Østergaard, Svend, 2000, "The staging of the body and mental causation", CISL-Urbino paper, unpublished.

Posner, Roland e.a., 2000, "Making a nose at someone", In The Berlin Dictionary of Everyday Gestures, Research Center for Semiotics, TU Berlin (in press).

Fauconnier, Gilles and Turner, Mark, "Conceptual Integration Networks", 1998, Cognitive Science 22 (2).

SEMINAR ON COGNITION AND SEMIOTICS

Svend Østergaard

Wednesdays in seminar weeks, 12:15 - 2:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

This seminar will serve as an introduction to theoretical concepts that stem from cognitive linguistics (especially L. Talmy, cf. Bundgaard's Seminar on Phenomenology and Language) but which have a much broader application than language proper, inasmuch as these concepts capture the general principles for how humans understand the phenomenal world. In fact, the concepts will be introduced and exemplified mainly through aesthetic expressions such as paintings, photographs, and short prose. The terms introduced in the seminar include the following:

Blending and mental spaces, which will be used to analyse the communicative situation, or in semiotic terms, the structure of enunciation.

Figure and ground, which are elements of a more extended system for how humans understand and represent relations between elements in space and time, obviously relevant for understanding how perception works, but also determinant for how we conceive a text or a painting.

Windows of attention, a concept that refers to a general system for making inferences about the world. For

instance, suppose attention is focused on a small part of a scene, what kind of inference concerning the whole scene does the mind come up with?

Force dynamics, which covers our general understanding of dynamic relations, not just between objects in the phenomenal world, but also the dynamic relations that we infer when reading a text or looking at a picture.

These and other principles for human understanding are all examples of the human ability to reduce a complex phenomenon to a simple schematic form. We will therefore pay special attention to the notion of *image-schema*. Under the assumption that image-schematic representations exist we will discuss whether they are invented by the mind or whether they are aspects of the represented phenomena. This last topic will also be discussed in Bundgaard's Seminar on Phenomenology and Language.

SEMINAR ON TECHNO-SEMIOTICS

Peter Bøgh Andersen, Svend Østergaard and Per Aage Brandt

Tuesdays, September 12, October 10 and November 7, 1:15 - 4:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

I

Machine semiosis

By this term we simply mean any creation of meaning mediated or motivated by machines.

All machines are artefacts — tools that have inner processes running across distinct energy types, so that one energetic behavior is controlled by another energetic behavior, and so on until the highest instance, that of human control – which implies that they are built with a purpose. This means that their structure and behavior cannot be properly understood unless the intention of the constructors is known. Also, the notion of mechanical faults and errors only makes sense as a deviation from the original intention. Therefore, all machines possess intentional meaning distinct from their causal, physical behavior.

Computer systems possess a much richer variety of meanings than other machines since they do not primarily process energy and matter: their main purpose is to process representations, to control other machines, and to interact with human users of representations or machines. The meaning conveyed by the interface is one familiar example of machine semiosis.

However, apart from understanding the information conveyed by a normal interface, users often need to understand aspects of the technical processes ‘behind the stage’. This is necessary, for instance, if they wish to tailor a piece of software according to their needs or if they need to assess the situation after a mistake has

occurred. The latter is particularly important in safety-critical work.

The purpose of this session is to identify and classify the various types of semiosis occurring as part of machine construction and usage. Maritime instrumentation will serve as the main example.

Guest speaker: Frieder Nake (Media Science, University of Aarhus; Informatik, Bremen)

II

Process ontologies

The seminar asks the following question: What if reality is basically composed of processes, and structure is merely a supervenient property of underlying processes?

After a century of structuralism during which the state was considered basic, a process ontology has begun to emerge in various sciences. The idea is that the intricate stable structures we observe can be explained as the result of many concurrent, local and simple processes. The purpose of the seminar is to explore the theoretical, empirical and practical consequences of a process ontology.

What is gained by considering processes basic, and which difficulties arise? Are there empirical phenomena that are more difficult to explain under the process assumption than under the structure assumption?

What are the practical consequences of a process ontology in engineering? Are we invited to construct hard- and software differently if there are only meta-

stable equilibria that will eventually change? Can databases, for example, be made more immune against conceptual and real changes in the domain they represent?

Background reading: *Downward Causation. Minds, Bodies and Matter*. Ed. P. Bøgh Andersen, C. Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann, & P. Voetmann Christiansen. Aarhus University Press: Aarhus, 2000.

Guest speaker: **Claus Emmeche** (Niels Bohr Institute, University of Copenhagen)

III

Language as a dynamic system


The seminar discusses the idea of viewing language as a self-organizing dynamic system. A structuralistic approach will explain usage as a manifestation of an underlying system, where the system is the constant, and usage the variable. However, it is a fact that language changes, some features slowly, others faster. This requires the system to change, but how should we conceptualize system changes, what are the agents of change, and which causal paths do language changes follow?

If language is viewed as a self-organizing process where usage is the basic process and the language system is supervenient upon usage, then language changes present no conceptual difficulties; however, we are faced with a new problem: how language can be stable at all. Also, seemingly real phenomena like ‘Systemzwang’ are difficult to explain.

Finally, if the notion of shared rules — for instance, grammatical rules, existing independently of the individuals — is still considered to be valid, how will theories of self-organization explain this phenomenon?

Using self-organizing processes as a means of explanation requires the linguist to utilize new tools because analytical treatment of such complex phenomena is often impossible. Computer simulations have been used as means to explore corresponding models in other sciences, and have recently been applied in a Danish Ph.D. dissertation on a large empirical corpus.

Guest speaker: **Dorthe Duncker** (Nordic Philology, University of Copenhagen)



Pablo Picasso: *Drawing*, 1926. Indian ink.

VISITING PROFESSOR: GILLES FAUCONNIER



Gilles Fauconnier, Chair and Professor of the Department of Cognitive Science, University of California, San Diego, will be visiting the Center in November 2000.

He is the author of *Mental spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language*, 1994, and *Mappings in Thought and Language*, 1997 (both from Cambridge University Press).

The notion of mental spaces is due to his first major work, *Espaces mentaux*, 1984 (Ed. de Minuit), in which he introduced the idea of analysing certain paradoxical references by means of distinct, interconnected semantic wholes or ‘spaces’, mental constructions that in various ways differ from the possible worlds in logic and that have received a cognitive interpretation. With Mark Turner, he subsequently elaborated the cognitive theory of conceptual integration and blending.

“Meaning in everyday thought and language is constructed at lightning speed. We are not conscious of the staggering complexity of the cognitive operations that drive our simplest behavior. [*Mappings...*] examines a central component of meaning construction: the mappings that link mental spaces. A deep result of the research is that the same principles operate at the highest levels of scientific, artistic, and literary thought, and at the lowest levels of elementary understanding and sentence meaning. Some key cognitive operations are analogical mappings, conceptual integration and blending, discourse management, induction, and recursion...”

The lectures will be about the most recent developments in the theory of conceptual blending. We will discuss the remarkable compressions found in integration networks, and the vital relations that operate within and across mental spaces.

This will lead to the notion of double-scope creativity, and what it means for cognitively modern humans and for the origins of language, art and science.

The constitutive and governing principles that constrain blending will be studied in some detail.

In Aarhus, Gilles Fauconnier will lecture the following dates:

Tuesday Nov 21, 2:00-4:00 p.m.:

1. *Dynamics of Meaning Construction*

Wednesday Nov 22, 2:00-4:00 p.m.:

2. *Compression and Insight*

Wednesday Nov 29, 10:00 a.m. -12:00 noon:

3. *Double Scope Creativity*

Thursday Nov 30, 10:00 a.m. -12:00 noon:

4. *Governing Principles*

All lectures at Center for Semiotics, Auditorium 221.

Gilles Fauconnier’s homepage:

<http://cogsci.ucsd.edu/~faucon/>

MODELS, MAPS, SCHEMATA **Semiotics and cognitive science**

Congress of NASS (Nordic Association for Semiotic Studies)

November 23-25, 2000, Copenhagen

Semiotics has no doubt undergone a cognitive revolution during the last decade. Many of the central issues of the semiotic tradition are now attacked in fertile ways from various cognitive points of view (not always necessarily using the term semiotics). In order to investigate this development, the congress highlights this relationship and the relevant semiotic subjects: models, maps, schemata. Paper proposals will be welcome within all the traditional subdisciplines of semiotics – only, the specific treatment should relate to the overall congress theme.

Proposals should be mailed or e-mailed to semiotik@hum.ku.dk before September 1, 2000.

Organized by the board of NASS (Kjell-Lars Berge, University of Oslo; Drude von der Fehr, University of Oslo; Göran Sonesson, University of Lund; Göran Rossholm, University of Stockholm; Frederik Stjernfelt, University of Copenhagen).

Director:

Frederik Stjernfelt, Dept. of Comparative Literature, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 80, DK-2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark. E-mail: stjern@hum.ku.dk

Plenary speakers:

Terrence Deacon (University of Boston), Gilles Fauconnier (University of California at San Diego), Peter Gärdenfors (University of Lund), Francis Edeline (Université de Liège), Winfried Nöth (Universität Kassel), Barry Smith (SUNY at Buffalo) Per Aage Brandt (University of Aarhus), Jesper Hoffmeyer (University of Copenhagen), Jørgen Dines Johansen (University of Odense).

Session chairmen:

Claus Emmeche (*biosemiotics*), Michael May (*diagram semiotics*), Martin Skov (*neuro-semiotics*), Nils Gunder Hansen (*social semiotics, semiotics of theology*), Dan Zahavi (*phenomenology*), Henrik Jørgensen (*linguistics*), Kjell-Lars Berge (*prose theory*), Drude von der Fehr (*literary theory*), Göran Sonesson (*arts and image semiotics*), Svend Østergaard (*mathematics and semiotics*), Andreas Roepstorff (*anthropology and semiotics*), Hans Siggaard Jensen (*semiotics and economics*).

For further information: www.ihl.ku.dk/~mskov/nass.htm

Ph. D. Course announcement:

WHAT IS LANGUAGE?

THE CONTRIBUTION OF LINGUISTICS TO THE HUMANITIES OF TODAY

This series of lectures will be held in Danish; the following is a Danish presentation of the lectures:

Hvad er sprog:

Sprogvidenskabens bidrag til dagens humaniora.

Center for Kulturforskning vil i de kommende år i et samarbejde med fakultetets fag danne ramme for en række ph.d.-kurser, hvor humanistiske grundlagsformuleringer tages op, ved at de forskellige fagligheder, som humaniora ofte deles op i, præsenterer de indsigter, som bidrager eller som burde bidrage til humaniora generelt. Kurserne henvender sig således bredt til fakultetets ph.d.-studerende og undervisere.

I samarbejde med Center for Semiotik er der i efteråret 2000 tilrettelagt et kursusforløb, hvor sprogforskningens bidrag til et alment eller tværfagligt humaniora er emnet. Kurset henvender sig således til alle de ph.d.-studerende, der er interesseret i at brede deres faglighed ud, søge kendskab til og lade sig inspirere af det, der i dag foregår inden for den sprogforskning, der flere gange i fortiden har sat dagsordenen for humaniora generelt som f.eks. med sproghistorien og med strukturalismen.

Arr.: Center for Kulturforskning og Center for Semiotik.

Sted: Center for Kulturforskning, Finlandsgade 28.

Tid:

10.15 - 12.00: Forelæsning

13.00 - 15.00: Workshop med ph.d.studerende

15.00 - ? Fredagsbar

Fredag den 8. september:

Professor Ole Togeby: *Tekst og Grammatik.*

Fredag den 6. oktober:

Lektor Peter Bakker: *Sprogs bidrag til socialhistorisk forskning.*

Fredag den 3. november:

Professor Per Aage Brandt: *Syntaks og betydning - fra Hjelmlev til kognitiv lingvistik.*

Fredag den 1. december:

Professor Lene Fogsgaard & forskningslektor Svend Østergaard: *Ordklasserne - en afsøgning af den semantiske motivation for ordklassestrukturernes interne organisering.*

Da der kun er begrænset plads, bedes man melde sig på e-mail: semtina@hum.au.dk

S E M I N A R C A L E N D A R

August

Wednesday 30	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics	
Thursday 31	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	15-17: Psycho-Semiotics

September

Tuesday 12		13-16: Techno-Semiotics	
Wednesday 13		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 14	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Philosophical Semiotics	14-18: Semiotic Research Group Meeting
Wednesday 27		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 28	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	15-17: Psycho-Semiotics

October

Tuesday 10		13-16: Techno-Semiotics	
Wednesday 11		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 12	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Philosophical Semiotics	14-18: Semiotic Research Group Meeting
Wednesday 25		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 26	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	15-17: Psycho-Semiotics

November

Tuesday 7		13-16: Techno-Semiotics	
Wednesday 8		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 9	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Philosophical Semiotics	14-18: Semiotic Research Group Meeting
Tuesday 21		14-16: Gilles Fauconnier	
Wednesday 22		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-16: Gilles Fauconnier
Thursday 23	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	15-17: Psycho-Semiotics
Wednesday 29	10-12: Gilles Fauconnier		
Thursday 30	10-12: Gilles Fauconnier		

December

Wednesday 6		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 7	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Philosophical Semiotics	14-18: Semiotic Research Group Meeting

Center for Semiotics

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