


SEMIOTICS

SEMINARS · LECTURES



SPRING SEMESTER 2001

Center for Semiotics
UNIVERSITY OF AARHUS

Center for Semiotics

UNIVERSITY OF AARHUS

ADDRESS

Finlandsgade 28
DK-8200 Aarhus N
Denmark

PHONE

(+45) 89 42 44 99

FAX

(+45) 86 10 82 28

E-MAIL

semtna@hum.au.dk

INTERNET

www.hum.au.dk/semiotics

COVER ILLUSTRATION AND ILLUSTRATIONS PP. 4, 7, 11, 13 AND 15:
Willy Ørskov: *Flexions*. Pneumatic sculptures. 1967-1985.

INTRODUCTION

THE REALITY OF MEANING

by Per Aage Brandt

Semiotics is simply the study of meaning. But nothing is simple. The thing we call meaning is a special sort of reality, paradoxically specified by being radically unspecified. Any specification creates a species, e. g. a physical, social, psychological, or fictional 'reality'; we use specifications like these in daily life, whenever we refer to domains in which expert knowledge of some sort exists, whether we have access to it and wish to use it or not. De-specification, bracketing of all specifications, by contrast, creates *a notion* of the thing we want to study, and an approximation of this thing as a possible object of scientific scrutiny: it is supposed to be real, and thus independent of our notions of it. The reality of meaning according to this approach can of course be doubted: Is there really such a thing 'out there'? And how can a de-specified thing be studied specifically?

The phenomenological tradition incessantly asks the same questions and tries to give possible answers. The semiotic tradition should probably have paid better attention to that debate, instead of preferring to work in parallel and too often assuming that the authority of *discourse* settles the issue. But discourse is but a feeble shadow of meaning: we cannot assume that language will inform us of the entire body of meaning. Language is just another immense challenge to the student of meaning, besides objectified signs (symbols, icons, indices, diagrams, etc.), gestures, art and artifacts, sensory and mental experiences. Whether we theoretically agree or not, our minds are convinced that there are

minds, states, events, acts, causal sequences, possibilities, individuals, laws etc. 'out there'; that we can in principle represent them without changing them; and that they may change, be changed by us, resist our understanding or our attempts to modify them, or be unchangeable. In other words, that there is meaning, given to us in time and space, as an objective condition that we can refer to and think of in different ways which we can communicate without fully understanding what we are doing. The cognitive turn in semiotics introduces the view that meaning is a natural condition, an aspect of nature that we might call intelligibility, and which is given to us as 'cognizers'. We access it by (methodological) de-specification, but then we (ontologically) re-specify it when analyzing it as structured. This is the difficult part: its 'status' changes when it is moved from the frame of *access* to the frame of *analysis*. Once installed in the analytical frame, it can be specified as a structured content both of that frame and of some given cognitive act.

We think and communicate — act cognitively — mainly by displaying imaginary variations of given belief contents, and we do not stop at the threshold of the impossible. Here is an example, a well-known, but still rather resistant conundrum, *counterfactuality*.

- (1) *If I were you, I would not do this.*
- (2) *What would you do if you were me (in my shoes)?*

Semiotically, we might ask why we do not get: [**If I were you, what would you do? —*I would not do this, if you were me.*]?

I am not you, but by projecting myself onto you, I can give you advice. You are not me, but by projecting you onto myself, I can have you giving me advice, not to take it. The projected person is supposed to give the advice. This is probably a cognitive law. Let us try to understand why there is a significant direction of the counterfactual projection and why it determines the direction of the advice.


Ad (1). In one mental space, you are alone, and you “do this”. In another mental space, I am alone, and I do things my way. Then the two spaces are connected by a mapping of person “you” and of “doing this” in the first space onto person “I” and “doing things my way” in the second space. These mappings are non-directional (can be read both ways). But in a counterfactual blended space, “you” and “I” coincide, merge into one person, and the two doings are imported, still as two distinct doings. In a third mental space, knowledge is mobilized about doing things *in specific ways* (W) and giving preference to doing particular things (P); W affects P, in that W rules out P. This dynamic system maps onto the two unconnected doings in the blended space and con-

nects them. And a final blend obtains, in which “doing things my way” rules out “your doing this”. Here, the W of “I” erases the P of “you”. So the result is a person “not doing this”, and this person is the former P-agent, “you”, whose behavior has been changed after suffering the occupation by the W-transferring “I”. Therefore, “I” is projected onto “you”, and the inverse is not the case, in (1).

Ad (2). The same mental space network, including two blends, is running. But in the third space, W gives privilege to P, instead of erasing it. And this time, person “you” carries both W and P, whereas person “I” carries nothing. The result is a person “I” deciding to do P after being subject to an occupation by the carrier of W and P, “you”.

The carrier of W is the projected person in both cases. W is the implicit motivation of the advice. But the system W-P is only introduced after the non-directional person-to-person mappings, and it is not part of the initial input spaces. It is instead an important part of the cognitive networks we use when, almost automatically, we do counterfactual reasoning.

This, I assume, may be an account of what is *really* going on in these examples. The reality I refer to by using this adverb is that of meaning.



SEMINAR ON GENERAL SEMIOTICS

Per Aage Brandt

Wednesdays in seminar weeks, 2:15 - 5:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

Regrettably, there are no valid general theories of language, the human mind, and human societies. Can there then be a valid general theory of meaning? Can we posit a valid general semiotics?

The question of how to ground the thing called meaning is implied in those concerning language, the mind, and society. There might even be an evolutionary sense to a chain like the following: meaning mind language society. In fact, if *meaning* evolves in the interaction between a highly unstable physical world and the humanoid neural system, yielding structured phenomena (perceived, recalled, expected, and transmitted), then it could have shaped our ability to feel that there is something to share in what perceivably happens, and that we are *minds* that do share this, independently of what happens to us individually. There would therefore be a generally accessible level of reality, namely meaning-for-minds, that our signs can refer to independently of our individual selves, and that our bodily and proprioceptive expressions can individually recombine in such a way that creative contacts can obtain between minds within a community of minds: *language* could arise from this opportunity. The recombining—syntactic—sort of communication would then lead to shared planning, conspiracy, implicit or hidden meanings in signs, indirect discourse, transfers of speaker's authority, social hierarchies, power systems, and rule-governed inclusion or exclusion of individuals as regards territories, possessions, and public spaces: the

societal order emerges.

We know that human communication—speech acts—creates intersubjective states and behaviors, and that it motivates inclusions and exclusions, both solidarity and violence, both fiduciary contracts and polemic defiance—our emotional equipment seems to reflect this dramatic condition of a semiotically built communitary life.

Words are possibly neutral, 'harmless', and 'peaceful', but syntax surely triggers conflict, because speakers and signers inscribe their creative dissidence in almost every utterance, as their signature. Only in situations of celebration do we speak without adding problematic contents to the current state of the realm of meaning. The semiotic phenomenon of *negation* is precisely as crucial as Hegel thought it to be.

Linguistic syntax is inseparable from *enunciation* (the signer's and the signee's roles and shares in utterance meaning), and negation is importantly related to this enunciative aspect of syntax: any novel meaning, emerging as a result of recombination, is contrastive and dynamically opposed to alternative meanings. Meanings oppose, and distinctive structures arise as naturally as social oppositions of mutually exclusive believers in them. This fact motivates Lakoff's conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, which might however be more accurately phrased as follows: SYNTAX IS CONFLICT—speaking is fighting, with immaterial weapons. Language is a necessary asocial

and unstable component of any stable society.

Negation is also one of the most difficult phenomena of the semiotic catalogue of problems. It takes mental space and blending theory, theory of counterfactuality and conditionality, space delegation theory, theory of causation, modality, and narrative dynamics, only to understand the issue.

But this is precisely what this semester's seminar intends to do. It inherits V. Ramashandran's motto (an

advice given by J. A. Wheeler):

In any field, find the strangest thing and then explore it.

Strange things are seldom just complex versions of the simpler things we already think we understand. Instead, the ideas we might bring forward in order to treat the monsters of a field are often just those we need for understanding the alleged trivialities better. Let us call this the *teratological principle* of current philosophy of science. [Teratology: the study of monsters.]

SEMINAR ON COGNITIVE PRAXEOLOGY

Carl Erik Kühl

Tuesdays (see calendar), 2:15 - 4:00 p.m. Conference room 232.

Originally, the term 'praxeology' was coined by the Polish philosopher T. Kotarbinsky. Later, and with a different meaning, it has been introduced to sociology by Pierre Bourdieu. As it will be used in the current seminar, it is related to a specific Norwegian philosophical trend developed in the 1970s and 80s (See Skirbekk (ed.): *Praxeology*, Oslo 1983). Cognitive praxeology may be defined as the study of the agent's understanding of his own practice as constitutively embedded in that practice.

As such, praxeology is not philosophy of language, let alone a linguistic discipline. At best, it may be seen as drawing consequences *from* philosophy of language, more specifically the later Wittgenstein—and language game theories. In that sense it may be compared to certain trends within cognitive linguistics. When linguists

study phenomena like "mental spaces", "blends", "domains [of thought]" etc. they are, for a while, bracketing their attitude as linguists. Blends, for example, are in fact not necessarily, maybe even not primarily, a matter of verbal activity. Correspondingly, practical situations may or may not—by necessity or contingency—involve verbal activity. In all cases, the agent's understanding of his own agency and of what he is doing is built into the act as an inherent aspect of stating *that* he does it and *how* he does it. Accordingly, the primary aim of cognitive praxeology is to do what the agent never does when performing an action (and what he may even not be able to do, unless he is a praxeological counterpart of the linguist!), viz. to analyse that understanding.

NB: The language of this seminar will be Danish.

INTRODUCTION TO SEMIOTICS

Svend Østergaard and Peer Bundgård

Thursdays in seminar weeks, 10:15 a.m. - 12:00 noon. Auditorium 221.

Any science or scientific discipline has a present and a past. Its present is characterized by the level of insight it has achieved, the kind of models or theories it uses, the sort of objects it describes and upon which it applies these models and theories, etc. Its past, on the other hand, is a complex network of developments the theory has undergone, its background knowledge, the philosophers and scientific theories that have either played a crucial role for the development of the discipline as such or that, at some time, seemed to represent the cornerstone of the discipline. This background or these past stages are often not explicitly referred to by its members. Yet, the latter do often develop their theories with the aim of improving and renewing hypotheses that were once considered as essential and “true”.

Semiotics, of course, is no exception to this rule. The intention of this seminar is thus to propose a guided tour through the gallery of portraits of our semiotical ancestors. Among these the founders of semiotics: Saussure and Peirce; the grand old men in structural lin-

guistics (from which continental semiotics developed): Jakobson, Hjelmslev, Brøndal; the grandest old man in continental semiotics: Greimas; but also Barthes, Lévi-Strauss, Mauss, and philosophical and scientific theories cognate to semiotics and structuralism: Husserl, Gestalt theory, Georges Cuvier's and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire's functional holism in biology, Ernst Cassirer, René Thom, Umberto Eco, Jean Petitot, etc.

Our introduction will be neither exhaustive nor systematic. Only a handful of the names above will be examined each semester. The seminar is an opportunity to get acquainted with (and to read!) some of the mammoths of semiotics (and of science and philosophy in general). It is our intention to show the connection between traditional semiotics and the theories proposed today, and thereby we intend to show how the knowledge communicated in this seminar can be converted into operative models of analysis and explanation.

A reader will be provided.



SEMINAR ON SEMIO-LINGUISTICS

Lene Fogsgaard and Per Aage Brandt

Thursdays in seminar weeks, 12:15 - 2:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

During this semester, we will work on adverbs, adverbial expressions, and the verbs they are supposed to be 'ad', in addition to their nominal duties:

Oh, I almost forgot what I had to tell you
Almost everything is forgotten now

Almost (= not entirely / most of) is a quantifier. Its mereological (part-whole) meaning is shared by verbal and nominal occurrences. But in this example, it typically switches from a sense of imminence to one of generality. When adverbs appear in verbal contexts, they are *hot*: linked to speaker's attitude, gesture, enunciation; but in nominal contexts, they are *cool*: their meaning seems to freeze into schematic forms.

Once is enough for me VS. I met my once master
Perhaps we'd better go VS. I saw perhaps three people

The adverb *once* goes from the hot aspectual *hapax* meaning (never more) to the cool temporal meaning (past, former) when nominally used. The modal adverb *perhaps* passes from indicating an on-line suggestion to signifying an objective approximation. We never find the opposite (hot nominal VS. cool verbal) configuration. This apparent move from a performative to an informative use of the adverb might thus show us a gen-

eral tendency: conceptual schemas may be frozen meaningful gestures.

We want to study the possibility of giving an exhaustive account of adverbial meaning types and an inventory of corresponding core adverbs—including modal & logical, aspectual & temporal, deictic & anaphoric, quantifying & qualifying (of manner)—and to consider their role in sentence syntax. They seem never entirely to forget their grounding in enunciation.

The adverb *so* is a special case of multiple semantic and syntactic uses; but the above distinction still seems to be valid:

Why did you laugh so – I love you so
VS. I told you so – I hope so

The hot, verbally related use of *so* is emphatically deictic, whereas the cool nominal use is anaphoric and comparative. The schematic meaning stays basically the same: something present to the mind is determined as being equivalent, equal or superior to something else, in its future or in its past, which is of a certain importance or magnitude. It can be the effect or the cause of that thing: *...and so he died; he was so tired that...* This semantic openness is in itself an indication of its gestural grounding.

SEMINAR ON COGNITION AND SEMIOTICS

Svend Østergaard

Wednesdays in seminar weeks, 12:15 - 2:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

This seminar will further develop the topics presented in the fall. We will specifically study how the general principles for integration of meaning, as outlined in the fall semester, apply to aesthetic expressions: visual as well as written texts. As for visual representation, we might distinguish between two strata: 1) Any visual expression evokes the conceptual system of the perceiver, either in the form of direct representations of ‘juicy’ meaning, i.e. figures, scenarios, etc., known from the life world of the perceiver, or by way of abstract schematic forms that convey impressions of dynamic relations, of directions in space, of geometric relations etc. Our understanding of this level is dependent on the same cognitive principles that are exploited by language, and therefore the methods of cognitive linguistics can be applied to the analyses of this stratum. Especially we will find that the internal organization of this level is highly dependent on *blending*, since elements from different conceptual spaces can easily be brought together in a visual representation. The blending process can apply to the ‘juicy’ parts, as when a bottle is morphed into a carrot (cf. Magritte), or it can apply to more abstract schematic representations, as when a form related to flexible linear objects in hand scale, such as a knot, is blended with a non-flexible macro-scale form, such as a portal, cf. Willy Ørskov’s pneumatic sculptures. 2) The second stratum is the presentation. If the conceptual meaning of a figure is “woman”, then this meaning can be achieved in infinitely many ways,

depending on how the artist makes use of the material basis for the aesthetic expression. However, there are probably only small, finite numbers of parameters through which the presentation is attained. If we only deal with paintings, these parameters are: *colors, stroke effects*—including for instance *bulk effects, directionality, and curvature, dimensions* of the canvas; the *frame, the size* of the canvas; the *symmetry* properties of the canvas; etc. By the notion of symmetry we somehow return to the conceptual level, and one of the purposes of this seminar is to examine the relations between the two strata. For instance: Does the concept of blending have any meaning in relation to stratum 2? Can the impression of conceptual blending be enhanced by variations on elements from stratum 2—as seems to be the case in the knot example mentioned above? The main idea suggested would be that the presentation is a barrier to the smooth integration of the conceptual meaning, and therefore it is the elements of stratum 2 that at once evoke the meaning and blur it. This is in accordance with neuro-biological assumptions about how the brain processes information related to the various material constituents: color, directions, depth etc., cf. V.S. Ramachandran and W. Hirstein: *The Science of Art* (<http://www.imprint.co.uk/rama>).

As for textual representations, we will move from narratological analyses—which have to do with the internal structure of a story—towards text analyses, which have to do with the external ‘meaning’ of a liter-

ary text. If it is generally assumed that such a meaning exists and that it is not necessarily explicitly stated in the text, the problem is posed of how this is possible.


This part of the seminar will be in dialog with the course on classical semiotics with reference to *A.-J. Greimas* and *R. Barthes*.

SEMINAR ON THEO-SEMIOTICS

Joshua A. Sabih and Per Aage Brandt

Fridays in seminar weeks, 12:15 - 2:00 p.m. Auditorium 221.

How do we conceive of the relationships between individual and collective existence in time? Religious feelings about existence appear to answer that question. One of the possible generalizations that the seminar has touched upon is the following. There is an earthly world (W1) and a divine world (W2), and then a world of things to come (W3); and the access of W1 to W3 depends on the influence that W2 exerts on W1. But in its turn, this influence, or rather 'destination', depends on sacrificial interactions between W1 and W2:



Subjectivity in W1 is individual or collective. The responsibility of the individual subject Si is to facilitate the general passage of W1 — the life of the collective subject Sc — into W3 ('salvation'). If Si fails to serve this general project, it betrays or otherwise offends Sc.

We presuppose that Si is a member of Sc. Si belongs to Sc; Si is therefore related to Sc as to life itself. Si owes his life to Sc, and Sc can expect and vindicate Si's respect, obedience, and self-sacrifice (in J. Lacan's terminology: 'oblativity'). Si's symbolic or somatic disrespect can lead to catastrophe for Sc, because it can call down W2's wrath, barring Sc from reaching W3.

W2 may be inhabited by a population of abstract divinities or by only one (personal) god, Sg, in which case the relation between Si and W2 can be disputed, since it entails a possibly intimate relation Si-Sg that the community Sc cannot control. Cf. the problem of mysticism. Si is in principle dangerously unreliable. Therefore, the general state of affairs W1-W2 becomes dramatically indeterminable, so the community will have to have access to Si's intimate behavior, thoughts, and emotional attitudes and to control them in order to ensure its own 'salvation'. Monotheisms have to test the quality of faith and devotion of every believer. They dig into their believers' souls, and are never contented by mere ritual service.

A 'logic' along these lines might also explain why monotheisms develop intolerance, fundamentalism and

'holy warfare'. Only the imminence of *death* can reveal the true quality of individual devotion, and this quality is primarily expressed by the courage of the warrior. Secondly, it can, of course, be expressed by the perceivable signs of hatred felt for the collective enemy.

But the same logic may also explain why rationalism, openness to uninitiated strangers, and the preference for peace in W1 is in principle possible: the intimacy of

the relation Si-Sg is interpersonal, so Si can have experiences of spiritual contact with Sg *without ecstasy*, and Sg can then be interpreted as capable of reasoning, experiencing beauty, and committed to justice.

Instead of 'criticizing' religion, the theo-semiotic approach seeks to find its structures and grounding, and to understand its variability, comparing them to the historic evidence available.



SEMINAR ON PSYCHO-SEMIOTICS

Svend Østergaard and Per Aage Brandt

Fridays in seminar weeks, 10:15 a.m. - 12:00 noon. Auditorium 221.

In order to understand more of the human mind — our only interpretant of the phenomena linking the material world of our bodily existence and the immaterial world of the meanings we find in it — this seminar will focus on a series of current issues raised by neurological, psychological, and semiotic research. They will concern: 1) perception and attention systems in the brain; memory circuits and functions; language-related neurology; limbic-emotional processes; 2) basic emotions and other manifestations of affective meaning (moods, passions, laughter, sexual arousal); the semantics of humor; affect in speech; the ‘force’ and organization of speech acts; and the structures of enunciation.

We assume that the default ‘realism’ of human minds is not exclusively rooted in pheno-physical cognition — the perception and conceptualization of states and events in *space* — but that they also depend on *temporal* concepts grounded in cognitive processes involving inter-human attunement, empathy, cooperative or conflicting intentions (thus: volition in self and other), and communication (gestural, symbolic, sexual, linguistic) in general. In both respects, the spatial and the temporal, our affectivity seems decisively active.

When human subjects develop ideas of *impersonal* subjectivity — fatal forces, non-embodied minds, ‘authority’, spiritual values, theo-cosmologies, etc. — abstract cultural instances become a natural part of this ‘realism’, rather than ‘constructions’ in the sense of cultural relativism. These phenomena, immaterial as they

are, have to be acknowledged as genuine aspects of human cognitive semiotics, and are probably directly related to our *semantics of time*. All imagery seems dynamically bound to temporal schemas by which we have to mentally edit our representations (mental spaces and networks) as implying impersonal (olympic) viewpoints and ‘backwards volition’. We experience these last phenomena both in standard pheno-physical retrospection (short-term memory) and in standard intersubjective contact S1-S2, where S1’s prospective view occasionally meets S2’s retrospective view: S2 ‘wants’ or ‘does not want’ S1 to experience (in his future) what S2 experienced (in his past), so S1 can feel (by virtue of an integrating blend) that his future is created as a ‘destiny’ by S2’s (olympic and almighty) mind — even more so if S2 is a collective instance, maintained and affirmed by a symbolic expression (e.g. a curse). The future is then a Subject, an alien mind confronting or prescribing your life ... Religious apprehensions seem to be based on just that concept. The individual subject can thus even have supernatural experiences of Predestination. These are in fact quite normal consequences of the very structure of temporal cognition. Linguistic expressions of the future tense by volition, such as: “this will happen”, or by deontic coercion: “we shall overcome”, seem to reflect affective semio-cognitive forms of this kind. Hopes and fears.

By contrast, *personal* subjectivity, as in promises: “I will do it”; “you shall have the money back”, is struc-

tured by an inversion of the dynamic schema:

S1 S2 (both olympic and almighty), so that

S1 (both olympic and almighty) S2

The (hoping, fearing) other is confronting a personalized version of olympic omnipotence.

These modal aspects of meaning as experienced in everyday life are inseparable from human imagination in space-time. The gap between material and immaterial phenomena seems bridged by the structures of cognition.



VISITING PROFESSOR: WOLFGANG WILDGEN

Three lectures on *The Evolution of Cognition, Sign-Usage and Language in Man*

Professor, Dr. Wolfgang Wildgen (University of Bremen). **Auditorium 221.**

FIRST LECTURE

Evolutionary scenarios and conditions/forces which shaped human cognition

Tuesday, March 20, 12:15 - 2:00 p.m.

Evolutionary semiotics must start from Darwinian principles of evolution in its actual shape and consider possible scenarios of the evolution of the cognitive capabilities presupposed in human language and of language itself. If language has evolved in a certain span of time (actually, hypotheses ranging from half a million to 40,000 years are discussed) then a possible scenario must explain this rather rapid or very rapid evolutionary change. I shall sketch out four possible scenarios leading to human language and discuss the type of environmental forces and demands which could have shaped linguistic cognition.

SECOND LECTURE

The cognitive and linguistic capabilities of Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon Man

Wednesday, March 21, 10:15 - 12:00 a.m.

In the range from 50.000 to 20.000 years B. C. (late Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon Man), it is the quality of semiotic capabilities that has to be assessed rather than its existence. We may ask how some proto-language could evolve towards full-fledged semiotic and linguistic behaviors.

In this context, the cave-paintings in Southern France and Northern Spain must be analyzed from a

semiotic perspective. Other sources are rock-carvings that show continuity from Neolithic to recent cultures (e.g., in Australia). The transition to very early writing systems (since 5.000 B. C.) and the existence of old mythologies and quasi-scientific activities in Egypt and Mesopotamia allow for a reconstruction of the continuity between prehistoric semiotic systems and systems in usage today (including scientific methodologies). One may even guess the future development of human semiotic capacities.

THIRD LECTURE

How should cognitive linguistics integrate results and explanations in the domain of evolutionary semiotics?


Thursday, March 22, 12:15 - 2:00 p.m.

Any type of functional linguistics has to consider the evolution of linguistic functions and the conditions that made these functions appear. The centers of interest are:

- The diversification of sign-forms by the articulation in phonology, word-formation and syntax. Proposals by Bühler (*Sprachtheorie*) are discussed in this context.
- The separation of global, situative functions, like those called "Appell" (appeal) and "Ausdruck" (expression) by Bühler and the function of "Darstellung" (representation). How could the rather neutral function of representation emerge in a scenario of social control and empathy?
- The recursive organization (or multilevel chunking) of language in syntax and text/conversation leads to types of reflexive map-

pings which should be chaotic. How was this possibly (or even necessarily) chaotic outcome controlled in the evolution of language?

As a general consequence, the meaning of “functional linguistics” must be reassessed under the conditions of an evolutionary theory of language.



WEEK SCHEDULE, SEMINAR WEEKS

SPRING SEMESTER 2001

	TUESDAYS	WEDNESDAYS	THURSDAYS	FRIDAYS
10-12			Introduction to Semiotics	Psycho-Semiotics
12-14		Cognition and Semiotics	Semio-Linguistics	Theo-Semiotics
14-16	Cognitive Praxeology (4x)	General Semiotics	Research Meeting	
16-18			—do.—	

S E M I N A R C A L E N D A R

S P R I N G S E M E S T E R 2 0 0 1

FEBRUARY

Wednesday 7		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 8	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	
Friday 9	10-12: Psycho-Semiotics	12-14: Theo-Semiotics	
Tuesday 20			14-16: Cognitive Praxeology
Wednesday 21		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 22	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	14-18: Research Meeting
Friday 23	10-12: Psycho-Semiotics	12-14: Theo-Semiotics	

MARCH

Wednesday 7		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 8	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	
Friday 9	10-12: Psycho-Semiotics	12-14: Theo-Semiotics	
Tuesday 20		12-14: Wolfgang Wildgen	14-16: Cognitive Praxeology
Wednesday 21	10-12: Wolfgang Wildgen	12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 22	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Wolfgang Wildgen	14-18: Research Meeting
Friday 23	10-12: Psycho-Semiotics	12-14: Theo-Semiotics	

APRIL

Wednesday 4		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 5	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	
Friday 6	10-12: Psycho-Semiotics	12-14: Theo-Semiotics	
Tuesday 17			14-16: Cognitive Praxeology
Wednesday 18		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 19	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	14-18: Research Meeting
Friday 20	10-12: Psycho-Semiotics	12-14: Theo-Semiotics	

MAY

Wednesday 2		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 3	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	
Friday 4	10-12: Psycho-Semiotics	12-14: Theo-Semiotics	
Tuesday 15			14-16: Cognitive Praxeology
Wednesday 16		12-14: Cognition and Semiotics	14-17: General Semiotics
Thursday 17	10-12: Introduction to Semiotics	12-14: Semio-Linguistics	14-18: Research Meeting
Friday 18	10-12: Psycho-Semiotics	12-14: Theo-Semiotics	

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